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PREFACE
This report covers the Electronics Technology Project in Korea supported
by Loan 1676-KO. The loan of US$29.0 million was made to the Republic of Korea
for a project carried out by the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology
(KIET), which later merged into another institute called Electronics and
Tulecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), was approved on March 22, 1979.
The loan became effective on June 28, 1979, and was closed on June 30, 1986, four
years after the original plan.
The Project Completion Report (PCR) was prepared by the Electronics and
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), the implementing agency of the
Government of Korea. The PCR Overview, Basic Data Sheet and Highlights were
prepared by AS2IE.
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BASIC DATA SHEET
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal
Item Exoectation Actual
Total Project Costs (US$ million) 56.0 33.0
Loan Amount (US$ million) 29.0 29.0
Disbursed 29.0 23.9
Cancelled - -
Project Completion Date December 1982 June 1986
Proportion of Expense
Spent by Appraisal
Target Date 100Z 597
Financial Performance Fair
Institutional Performance Fair
CUMULATIVE STIMATED AND ACTURAL DISBURSEMENTS
FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 F1-4 FY85 FY86 FY87
Appraisal Estimate
(USS million) 13.30 21.90 27.00 29.00 - - -
Actual (US$ million) 0.04 7.95 14.71 17.12 20.40 20.59 20.68 22.64 23.9f4
Actual as Z of Appraisal - 36 54 59 70 71 71 78 83
Date of Final Disbursement: January 30, 1987
STAFF INPUTS
(staff weeks)
Fiscal Year Preaooraisal AoDraisal Negotiation Supervision Other Total
1977 2.5 - - - - 2.5
1978 48.5 - - - 1.5 50.0
1979 28.4 33.2 5.5 3.5 11.6 82.2
1980 - - - 13.9 - 13.9
1981 - - - 24.6 - 24.6
1982 - - - 32.2 - 32.2
1983 - - - 13.6 - 13.6
1984 .3 - - 22.7 - 23.0
1985 - - - 10.5 - 10.5
1986 - - - 9.9 .2 10.1
1987 - - - .4 - .4
1988 - - - 5.7 - 5.7
1989 . 2.3 2.3
Total 79.7 33.2 5.5 139.3 13.3 271.0
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MISSION DATA
Number of Date of
Item Date Duration persons Staff-weeks /a Report
(days)
Identification 11/75 7 1 1.0 12/03/75
Preparation 7/77 20 2 5.7 8/18177
Appraisal 5/78 16 4 9.1 11/22/78
Total - - 15.8 -
Supervision I 8/79 /b 5 1 0.4 10/15/79
Supervision II 3/80 Ic 5 2 0.5 4/30/80
Supervision III 5/80 5 2 1.4 5/28/80
Supervision IV 11/80 3 3 2.1 12/15/80
Supervision V 7/81 /d 8 3 1.1 8/28/81
Supervision VI 6/82 /e 9 3 2.0 8/19/82
Supervision VII 12/82 /e 8 2 1.1 1/21/83
Supervision VIII 11/83 /e /f 12 3 1.3 1103184
Supervision IX 6/84 9 2 2.6 9/11/84
Supervision X 5/85 6 2 1.7 6/28185
Supervision XI 5/86 /e 1z 18 3 2.6 7/17/86
Completion 5/88 11 1 1.6
Total 18.4
la The staffweeks spent on supervision of the project were proportionally
allocated based on the below.
/b Combined with supervision of Heavy Machinery Project (Loan 1466-KO).
rc Combined with preparation of the First Technology Development Project
(Loan 2112-KO).
/d Combined with appraisal of Loan 2112-KO.
/e Combined with supervision of Loan 2112-KO.
If Combined with preappraisal of the Second Technology Development Project
(Loan 2473-KO).
/ Combired with supervision of Loan 2473-KO.
v 
OTHR MROJECT DATA
Original
plan Revisions Actual
First Mer.tion in Files on Timetable 8!11/75
Government's Application 10131176
Negotiations 2123/79
Board Approval Date 3122179
Loan Agreement Date 3/29/79
Effectiveness Date b128/79
Closing Date 12/31/83 8/31/85
6/30/86 6/30/86
Borrower: Republic of Korea
Executing Agency: Korea Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET)/a
Fiscal Year of Borrower: January I-December 3.
/a Later merged into ETRI
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HIGHLIGHTS
In October 1976, the Government of Korea requested the Bank's support
to finance the establishment of a research institute in electronics to be
called the Korean Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET), to spearhead the
Korean electronic industry into advanced semiconductors. Accordingly, in
March 1979, the Bank approved a loan of US$29.0 million to finance the foreign
exchange portion of a project to build up, KIET's activities. Out of the US$29
million, US$5 million was earmarked for research, development and engineering
(RD&E).
ii. The objectives of the project were to develop KIET as a central
facility in the semiconductor industry, and, accordingly, to (i) provide
technological infrastructvre of essential production and support services;
(ii) assist in training of technical staff of the industry; (iii) lead the
industry in acquiring and developing technologies: (iv) carry out RD&E for
industry; and (v) explore market opportunities for the industry abroad.
iii. The construction of the semiconductor facility and the installation
of the necessary equipment were delayed by over one and a half years, and the
facility was ready to fabricate wafers, the major planned output, only in
October 1981. Training and research activities were likewise delayed.
iv. In 1983 the Korean industry started to invest heavily in
semiconductors. Contrary to expectations, the major corporations decided to
achieve self-sufficiency in the major services which KIET aimed to supply.
Accordingly, the demand for KIET's services from the private sector fell
considerably short of projected plans, and KIET's activities were shifted to
participation in government-sponsored projects. As a result, KIET did not
become a profit-making, self-financing institution as envisaged at appraisal
and remained a government RD&E center der--ading on government funding. The
RD&E portion of the project was not carried out, and the earmarked fund of
US$5 million was subsequently cancelled.
v. The Government decided in March 1985 to merge KIET with another
research institute in telecommunications and form a new institute called the
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). The Bank agreed
to the merger and to the transfer of KIET's activities from Gumi to Daejoun,
and also agrecd to transfer the undisbursed amount of the loan from KIE'i to
ETRI.
vi. The project could not sufficiently achieve many of the original
objectives, notably the financial profitability and industry-related R&D
programs. However, the project may have played an important catalytic role in
the electronic industry by proving to the Korean industry that acquiring
advanced technologies and capabilities is within their grasp.
- vlll 
vii. The most important lessons to be lcarned from this experience are the
following:
(i) There must be strong support and participation of industry.
(ii) Industry should have a say in the function of basic strategies
of the institute.
(iii) The top management of the institute should be industry-oriented
and entrepreneurial.
(iv) The legal and financial framework for such an entity should
allow the flexibility of a private sector organization.
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OVERVIEW
Introduction
1. This overview is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) of
the Electronics Technology Development Prpject (Loan 1676-KO) prepared by
the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), the
implementing agency of the Government of Korea. The loan of US$29 million
to the Republic of Korea for the establishment of Korea Institute of
Electronics Technology (KIET), which later merged into another institute
called ETRI. was approved on March 22, 1978. The loan became effective on
June 28, 1979 upon fulfillment of the conditions of effectiveness of the
loan, and was closed on June 30, 1986, four years after the original plan.
2. The retrospective analysis of the Electronic Technology Project in
Korea is of wider interest because the project supported a definite
industrial policy in the high technology area--an area in which the Bank
can expect increasing involvement in future years. The purpose of this
document is to highlight the most important aspects of the project, as
viewed by the Bank, in order to de-ive some useful lessons for future
lending. The additional assessment of the Bank complements and sometimes
differs from the views expressed by the borrower and is based on a mission
to Korea in May 1988 and other information in files at the Bank.
Project Background and Context
3. Korea has sustainied an extraordinary record of economic growth since
the 1960s. Given Korea's poor natural resource endowment, this growth was
based on the expansion of manufacturing, which grew between 1961 and 1977 at a
real rate of 191 p.a. A major impetus to this remarkable growth came from
exports, which grew at an average rate of 322 p.a. in real terms.
4. This growth was accompanied by a significant deepening of the
industrial structure and diversification of manufactured exports. One of the
emerging areas of growth was the electronics industry. This industry was
established in the early 1960s as an import-substitution industry oased on the
assembly of radios and other electronic consumer goods. It gained momentum
during the 1970s, spurred by direct foreign investment, joint ventures and the
growth of domestic firms. Production and exports increased at a rate of
about 50? p.a. between 1970 and 1977, leading the growth of the manufacturing
sector. The output of electronics industries in 1977 reached over US$1.7 bil-
lion. About two thirds of the output was exported. The industry became
increasingly important to the Korean economy. In 1977 it accounted for 112 of
Korea's total exports and employed over 140,000 persons.
5. At that time Korea's electronic production consisted primarily of
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ccaventional components (39Z), technologically mature, low-cost consumer
products such as watches, radios and black and white television sets (33Z),
assembly of advanced components, principally by wholly owned subsidiaries of
large US companies (182), and production of telecommunication equipment for
the domestic market (10Z).
6. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81) of the Government called for
concinuing emphasis on the electronics industry as a leading industry in
Korea'. export-oriented growth. The strategy was to focus initially on a few
technologies which would allow upgrade of the design and reliability of
Korea's existing product mix and at the same time permit entry into new areas.
In order to succeed, the strategy called for attracting foreign investment and
know-how and for development of domestic infrastructure and design and
manufacturing capabilities.
7. KIET was founded by the Government in December 1976 as a government
research institute under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) to
promot.? and cenduct development of the semiconductor and computer system area
and lead the effort in the Government's support of the electronics industry.
The idea was that in order to succeed in the industrial strategy, the
Government, through KIET, needed to provide the industry with the necessary
infrastructure and specialized services which could not be provided by each
individual companies. KIET was also meant to be the focal point for the
initial transfer of intermediate technologies to Korea and provide related on-
the-job training. Also, the Government, through KIET, intended to share with
private industry the costs and subsequent benefits of research, development
and engineering and promote cooperati;e R&D efforts among Korean firms.
8. The Bank played an important role in shaping the proposed strategy.
An industrial sector mission in November 1974 recommended that Korea seriously
consider the acquisition of semiconductor technology as a basis for the
development of its electronics industry, and that the cooperation of the
Government, industry and research institutions was vital for the achievement
of this objective. Subsequent Bank involvement in 1975 (as executing agency)
in a UNDP-financed Planning Assistance Project helped shape Korea's
development thrust in the semiconductor and digital systems industries in the
Fourth Five-Year Plan of the Government.
9. In November 1976, the Government requested the Bank's assistance in
financing the foreign currency component of a project designed to establish
KIET's activities. By March 1977 the project had been explicitly formulated
and the amount of the loan requested by the Government was US$29 million.
The Project
10. The primary objective of the project was to stimulate the development
of a technological base in the Korean electronics industry to achieve high
growth level. The proposed project was aimed to develop KIET to play a
central role in promoting such growth and accordingly to: (i) provide
technological infrastructure of essential production and support services,
(ii) assist in the required training and technical manpower development, (iii)
lead the industry in acquiring and developing semiconductor and system
technologies, (iv) carry out RD&E for industry, and (v) explore and develop
export market opportunities for Korean electronics industry overseas.
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11. The services KIET was to provide to the Korean industry were of broad
range. The assumption was that these services would reduce the initial
investment requirements of each individual company and facilitate its entry
into the electronics area. KIET services were largely expected to be
available by early 1980 and includeds
(a) Fabrication of wafers for the industry. This activity was
supposed to be the major activity and the biggest revenue
producer of KIET (662 of services revenues). The assumption was
that Korean private companies, such as Samsung Semiconductors
(which was already engaged in wafer fabrication) and other
companies which would enter this new activity, would produce
wafers for simpler devices while KIET would concentrate on more
sophisticated products.
(b) Supply of mask-sets for the domestic industry. This service,
which was to be needed for wafer fabrication within KIET. was
also to be provided to other wafer producers so as to substitute
imports and reduce turnaround time.
(c) Provide integrated circuit (IC) designs as tailor-made service
for individual firms. This service was expected to enhance the
competitiveness of the domestic industry.
(d) Testing services for the industry. At the time KIET was
conceived, there were no local facilities for carrying out
electrical and environmental testing of semiconductor devices
and system hardware. These services were obtained abroad at a
considerable expense.
(e) Contract system work. It was envisaged in particular that
KIET's pool of qualified personnel would have substantial
capability for the design and development of a wide range of
microprocessors, minicomputers and other digital systems for use
in Korea.
(f) Supplementary services, such as printed circuit boards (PCB), Hz
gas, education services, etc.
12. All the above mentioned activities were to generate revenue from the
private industry and KIET was supposed to breakeven in its third year of
operation. After breakeven net profits would increase, according to plan,
annually.
13. Aside from services to the industry, KIET's activities were intended
to include RD&E operations. The purpose of this activity was:
(a) to carry out research projects for the development of products,
processes and systems in the electronics industry;
(b) to carry out research costs for work conducted within KIET's
facilities; RD&E funds were not to finance the costs of in-house
research conducted by private industry;
(c) to carry out projects sponsored by either industry or KIET.
With regard to KIET-sponsored projects, however, broad industry
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interest in the end result of the project had to be established
to ensure that research work at KIET was closely tied to
industry goals of the RD&E project for which it was purchased.
14. According to the project financing plan, the Bank loan was expected
to provide USS24 million for the development of KIET (the foreign currency
part of physical facilities plus part of the technology items) and a loan of
US$5 million for the foreign currency portion of the RD&E program.
Implementation and Operation
15. The Government selected for the project a site in Gumi, a town some
200 km from Seoul. The Government hoped to attract into this area firms from
the electronics industry so that it would become a center for Korea's
electronics activity, with KIET as a focus. At the time KIET started its
building activities in Gumi, several electronics plants were already
established there. most of these in assembly operations, none in research
activities.
16. Construction of the semiconductor building, containing the "clean
area" in which research in semiconductor and wafer fabrication were to be
carried out, started to slip at an early stage. This segment of the project
was on the critical path for the project as a whole since the various proposed
services to industry and R&D could only start once the clean area facility was
available. However, the semiconductor building was completed, only in April
1981, 18 months behind schedule. Equipment was installed by the end of
September 1981. some 20 months behind original schedule. In retrospect, these
delays may have been a very important factor in the development of the
project. When major Korean electronics firms decided in 1982 and 1983 to
invest heavily in semiconductors, KIET did not have a leading technological
edge and its wafer fabrication capabilities were not considered reliable
enough by the industry.
17. In 1982 and 1983 the Korean industry started to invest heavily in
semiconductors. Contrary to the original assumptions, the major corporations
deciced to achieve self-sufficiency in the major services which KIET aimed to
supply. Accordingly, the demand for KIET's services from the private sector
fell considerably short of projected plans. At the same time the Government
decided that electronics was a priority industry, started to direct and
finance national projects in electronics and KIET's activities were shifted to
participation in government-sponsored projects. As a result, KIET did not
become a profit-making, self-financing institution as envisaged at appraisal
and remained a government RD&E center dependent on government funding. The
RD&E portion of the project was not carried out, and the earmarked fund of
US$5 million was subsequently cancelled.
18. During the period 1979 to 1985, KIET rendered the following
services to industry:
a) Wafer fabrication was carried out in 1983 and 1984 on a
small scale but the products were not sold to the local
industry but, rather, to a U.S. firm.
b) Mask sets were provided to industry. This activity which
initially was planned to be a marginal one in terms of
revenue turned out to generate 35Z.of revenue derived from
services to the industry.
c) Testing activities were performed on a small scale.
d) KIET provided H2 gas to the neighboring GoldStar plant of
bi-polar memories.
e) KIET provided tailor-made training services to the
industry. The activity was carried out on a modest scale
until 1984 and then terminated.
f) KIET has also provided, though not as a revenue-producing
service, on-the-job training to engineers who came to KIET
to participate in government sponsored projects.
g) IC design and system work as well as R&D were carried out
through the whole period not as services to the industry
but rather as government sponsored activities which were
financed on a cost plus basis.
19. Over the years, most of KIET's (and later ETRI's) revenue came from
the Government (including the item Project Revenue on the income statement in
Annex 4 of PCR). Only some 15? of the revenues came from private business or
exports. KIET, throughout the project period, did not manage to breakeven and
accumulated a loss of over Won 6.7 Billions.
20. As early as July 1980, the Government had considered to merge KIET
with two other organizations. This proposed change was the result of a
decision to reorganize all the research institutes under the Ministry of
Science and Technology (HOST). The Bank initially viewed the proposed merger
of KIET unfavorably and conveyed its concerns to the Government at various
occasions. The Bank's main concern was the lack of commonality between KIET
as an industry-oriented entity and the other government-owned research
institutes.
21. The Government decided, finally, in March 1985 to merge KIET with
anothar research institute in telecommunications and form a new institute
called the Electronics and Telecocimunications Research Institute (ETRI). It
was established in a different location and consequently KIET's original
facility in Gumi was sold to a private Korean company. The Bank agreed to the
merger and to the transfer of KIET's activities from Gumi to Daejoun, and also
agreed to transfer the undisbursed amount of the loan from KIET to ETRI.
Project Achievements and Impact
22. Until 1982 the rapidly growing electronics industry in Korea
practically ignored semiconductors. The shift occurred as a result of
worldwide shortages in semiconductors, which increased the prices of
semiconductors and also severely impaired production of consumer goods. It
was then that the leading companies in Korea decided to vertically integrate
and move aggressively into semiconductors as well. Accumulated fixed
investments in semiconductors in Korea from 1974 to 1981 amounted to about
US$200 million. In 1983 alone, investment totaled US$300 million, then
climbed to over US$400 million each year for 1984, 1985 and 1986. As a
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result, Korean firms managed to achieve-a prominent position among the world
manufacturers.
23. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent KIET and later on ETRI
contributed to the Korean thrust into semiconductors. It is clear that the
thrust has been industry led and not Government led. On the other hand, the
role of KIET in pioneering research in semiconductors and proving that Korea
can fabricate wafers successfully is undeniable. As one of the managers of
the Korean semiconductor industry puts it, "KIET gave us a shot in our arm."
To what extent the industry would have decided to go heavily into
semiconductors without KIET is a question to which there can be no definite
answer. Conversely, to what extent the manufacturer's decision to go-it-alone
was a result of the inability of KIET to deliver reliably and on time is also
not answerable. These two different views, which are not mutually exclusive.
can be heard from knowledgeable people inside and outside Korea.
24. Perhaps a balanced view of the project (and KIET's) assessment would
be that it played an important catalytical role but certainly not a leadership
role in the development of semiconductors in Korea as was originally
envisaged. KIET's pioneering efforts in 1979-81 in the acquisition and
development of semiconductor technologies and the demonstration effect it had
in Korea, and the training provided by KIET to personnel from private entry
probably in themselves justify the establishment of KIET.
25. There are possibly two factors that explain the inability of KIET to
assume a leadership role in the sector. First, while preparing this project.
the Bank underestimated the drive, dynamism and risk taking attitude of the
Korean private sector. Once the private sector made the decision to go into
semiconductors, it did so in a way which dwarfed KIET and, as a result KIET's
services became increasingly less attractive. In addition, the Bank also did
not anticipate the problems of getting the Korean industry to launch into a
cooperative venture given their fiercely competitive nature and a strong sense
of individualism. This proved to be one of the main obstacles to getting
KIET's R&D activities off the ground. Industry cooperation and support are
critical for an organization like KIET to succeed.
26. Adding to the problems was the lack of agility on the part of KIET's
management and the inability of the Bank to take early corrective action. The
two problems mentioned above had become evident at an early stage of project
implementation and the Bank urged the Government on numerous occasions to
instill more dynamism and private sector orientation into KIET's management.
But these efforts did not bear fruit. It can be argued that in a project like
this, it should not be surprising that things do not develop as originally
envisaged. But what is required on the part of the Bank is willingness and
decisive action to reshape the project.
27. In spite the industry's achievements the success of the Korean
industry in semiconductor is still not clear. The industry is
characterized by short life cycle products and by increasing R&D costs. So
far, the strategy of Korea was to follow the leaders and save on R&D in
order to compensate for lower effectiveness due to being a latecomer. This
strategy might not work in the future and the Government and industry might
look ahead to the future strategy and the role of ETRI. The Government
should probably do well to study the successes and failures of KIET in
adhering to its original strategy as stated in the appraisal report. Some
of the premises and conclusions in this report might be even more relevant
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to the present situation.
28. The successes or failures of the Electronics Technology Project can
only be judged against its objectives. If judged narrowly against the
original objectives of financial self-sufficiency or of completing the R&D
work program as stated in the appraisal report, the project could be said to
have failed in those areas. In retrospect, some of the objectives, for
instance, KIET revenue and profit targets may have been non-realistic.
29. However, in a much broader context, taking into consideration the
Korean semiconductor industry's big move in terms of investment in 1983/84 and
the huge quantum leap in terms of technological level from 1980/81 to 1983/84,
it could be said that the project and KIET may have played an important
catalytic role. In fact, the most single important achievement/success of
the project was to prove to Korean industry in 1981/82 that Korea, through
KIET, did acquire wafer fabrication capability and that advanced semiconductor
technologies were within their grasp.
30. The most important lesson that can be learned from this experience is
the need to enhance the chance of success for such ventures to ensure the
presence of the following factors:
(i) There must be strong initial support (including financial
support) and participation of industry. In order to ensure the
cooperation, industry should be represented in the management of
the venture or, at least, be in a position to influence
decisions. It is also important for an industry service/support
organization such as KIET to have a close working relation with
the Ministry with direct jurisdiction over the subsector
concerned.
(ii) The top management of the entity involved must be industry-
oriented and entrepreneurial to be able to deal effectively with
industry as well as Government.
(iii) The legal framework for such an entity should provide its
management with the flexibility and agility of a private sector
organization.
31. In the case of a Bank project in a high-tech area which is
characterized by technologies with short life-cycles and a rapidly changing
industrial environment, the Bank should be prepared to monitor constantly
the changing environment, the development of the project and the original
objectives and business plan in order to be able to respond quickly by
correcting deviations and/or changing objectives and financial plans. For
example, in a high-technology area, a facility suitable for research
purposes can become obsolete for the original purposes. In such a case it
is important to take into account during project design, a possibility of
the disposition of a Bank-financed facility. In view of this, the location
of the project facility is particularly important. The Bank would also
need access to technical experts in those areas in order to provide the
Bank and the borrower the reeded technical expertise and applied scientific
evaluation.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOQg PROJECT
(Loan 1676-KO)
I. INTRODUCTION
1.81 The Korea Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET), a government-
donated institution established in December 1976, conducted the technological
development of the semiconductor and computer systems areas in order to promote
the development of Korea's electronics industry. For this purpose, the Bank
provided KIET with the Electronics Technology Project (Loan 1676-Ko) which was
financed with the Bank loan of US $29 million. The project has been, in general,
adequately carried out in order to attain its objectives.
1.82 However, under the government's decision on the merger of KIET at
Cuai estate and Korea Electrotechnology and Telecommunications Research Institute
at Oaedog Science Park, a new institute was established as the name of Elec-
tronics and Telecommunications Research Institute in 1985, and accordingly
succeeded this loan project. Therefore, the names of all ETRI's hereafter mean
the former KIET and/or ETRI. Besides, the facility at Cumi established under this
project was transfered to the private sector in April 1986, and a new seaicon-
ductor esearch facility is under construction with the target of Its completion
in September 1987.
II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
Preparation. Appraisal nd Nexotiations
2.01 In November 1976, the Coveriwtent of the Republic ofKorea (ROK) re-
quested Bank assistance to finance a project that would promote and assist he
technological development of he Korean electronics ndustry. The Bank played an
important role in shaping the project. The industrial sector mission of November
1974 recommended that Korea should seriously consider acquisition of the semi-
conductor technology as a basis for development oi its electronics ndustry, and
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the cooperation f Covernnent, inidustry arid research institutions was vital for
the achievement of this objective. Subsequently, in 1975-76, the Bank acted as an
executing agency for a UNESP-financed Planting Assistance Project, which included
a review of the prospects of the electronics industry and suggestions for policy
formulation i this sector over the period of the 1977-81 Five Year Plan ; the
Plan emphasizes industry's new development thrust in the direction of the semi-
conductor and digital systems areas.
2.02 The Government of the ROK applied to the 8ank for the project with
$28 million of foreign cost in March 1977. A project preparation mission visited
Korea in July 1977 to review the project proposed by the Government to develop
ETRI, and recommended that ETRI should be rediredted from a relatively isolated
research institution toa service-cum-RDJE organization catering to and working
directly with industry. The second project preparation mission in May4June 1978
appraised a $52.8 million project with a foreign cost element of $27.7 million.
The appraisal was completed in November 1978.
2.83 Negotiations for the loan was completed in Washington in February 1979.
The Diak's Board approved a loan of $29 million to ETRI with a Covernment Cuarantee
in March 1979. The Loan agreement was signed on March 29, 1979.
Project Objectives
2.84 The objective of the project was to promote the technological deve-
lopment of the Korean electronics industry through :
(a) the further development ofETRI and the Upgrading
(b) the carrying out by ETRI of programs of technology aquisition, training
and manpower development ; and
(c) the carrying out in ETRI's facilities of a program of research, develop-
ment and engineering for the benefit of the electronics industry in Korea.
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The Program and Project
2.85 The project for the period 1979 - 82 consists of the following
parts
Part A: (1) Construction a d equipping of a semiconductor building, an admi-
nistrative and systems activities building, a training center,
a power sub-station with an emergency power generating system,
a uility plant with air hauidling and chilling equipment, a dion-
ized water plant and a pure hydrogen generating plant, including
the provision of land therefor.
(2) Construction a d furnishing ofhousing and dining facilities for
ETRI's taff, including the provision of land therefor.
Part 8: (1) Carrying out of a program of academic, on-the-job and overseas
staff training, including the provision of educational materials,
staff attendance at international conferences and seminars and
invitations offoreign experts to provide ETRI with required
technical assistance and to conduct short workshops and seminars
at ETRI's facilities.
(2) Carrying out of a technology acquisition program consisting of
the purchase of technology through licensing or other arrange-
ments with companies and institutions engaged in electronics and
other related activities.
Part C: (1) Carrying out at ETRI's facilities of a research, developaent and
engineering program designed to adapt proven technologies, up-
grade existing product capabilities and develop new products in
the electronics field for the benefit of the electronics industry
in Korea. The program consists of the carrying out of specific
subprojects for the development of products, processes and systems
up to the final development s age.
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;2) The provision of technology, equipment, speciality materials,
experts' services and overseas training required for the proper
carrying out of the above subprojects.
Covenants
2.06 The status of compliance with Loan and Project Agreenments is at
Annex 1. Performance with respect o compliance with covenants has generally been
good, though poor in some respects of the area of operation of RD&E program. The
reason for this is discussed in the relevant section of this report.
III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-up
3.81 All the conditions for loan effectiveness were met within the appro-
priate period and the loan was declared effective on June 28, 1979.
Project Revision
3.02. The project did not undergo any substantial revision during 1979-82.
There were, however, the following changes :
(a) ETRI's uccession f the project with the merger of KIET at Gumi estate
and KETRI at Daedog Science Park ;
(b) Cancellation fthe use of RD & E fund ; and
(c) Transfer of the Cumi facilities to the private sector.
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Impleaentation Schedule
3.83 she original schedule for construction f the various component
works of the project provided for project completion bySeptember 1979. However,
the construction of the semiconductor building was completed in April 1981, 18
months behind the original schedule, and that of computer building, ia May 1982,
two years and 8 months late. The delay in project execution was caused by the
following factors :
(a) the semiconductor building, as the filst construction i Korea, needed
more careful review of the building design by Rasmussen Ingle Anderson
Corp. in the USA and well-experienced expert's consulting due to its
speciality :
(b) the delay in installation f the facility-supporting equipments for
mechanical works due to long-lead time for their procurement with foreign
expenditure ; and
(c) the budget shortage for the computer research building, resulting in its
completion with the additional budget of about 508 million won in 1982.
The delay in construction fsemiconductor building was to a great measure
contributory tothe delays in delivery and installation f research equipment,
whose installation, i  most cases, were delayed until the end of September 1981.
3.84 The original schedule for overseas training and foreign invitation
programs was to be conducted for the period of 1979 to 1981. In execution, these
training and expert invitation programs have been continuosly carried out until
1986. A comparision f the original appraisal and actuals on these programs is
given below
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Table 1: s RAINING EXPERT INVITATION
(Units Han-months)
fippraisal Estimate Actuals
Description
Number man-months Number man-nmontlhs
Trainina
* Semiconductor 65 330 54 316
. Systems 78 428 46 378
.Management 8 48 5 13
Total 143 858 185 707
Conference 25 - 63 -
Expert Invitation
.Semiconductor 32 32 la 46
. Systems 32 32 21 11
.Management 17 17 -
.Technical 1 20 1 17
Advisor
.Facilities 3 1 2 23
Total 85 164 34 97
The training and expert invitation programs were somewhat poorly progressed
until 1981 because of (i) the heavy preasure on construction fsemiconductor
building and procurement ofresearch equipment, and (ii) the difficulties in
locating proper training institutions and suitable xperts in selected tech-
nology areas who were willing to provide such services. However, generally
speaking, these programs have been adequately carried out to attain the objec-
tive of up-grading of ETRI's tech&a,-:cal base in the areas of semiconductor
and computer system.
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3. 05 The technology acquisition program for 1980 was first prepared in
Noveiber 1979 and submitted to IERD, but ihereafter no further pro-,ess was
made. In May 1982, a technology transfer avrEt.ent with VLSI Technology, Inc.
(VTI) in the USA was made in order to acquire the silicon gate MMOS technology
of 32K/64K ROM with the terms and conditions ofprovision to VTI of the wafers
processed in return for royalty as the technology fee. With this technological
assistance, ETRRI successfully established 32K/64K ROM production technology,
first in Korea. In November 1985, a joint development agreement on super-mini
computer system was made with American Information Technology, Inc. in the USA
with the terms and conditions ofpayment of one million dollars of technology
fee. Under this agreement, 16 meabers of ETRI staff are under training for the
acquision of VLSI design, and hardware/software technologies design of computer
system for one year to June 1987.
3.86 The RD&E program was to finance both ETRI and industry-sponsored
projects carried out in ETRI's facilities for the development ofproducts,
processes and systems up to the final development s age. To ensure that research
work is closely related to industry goals, the major portion of the research work
carried uut in ETRI's facilities was required to have an industry sponsor. As the
RD&E program required of the above terms and conditions, any agreement between
ETRI and industry for such project had not been reached by 1981 due to the
industry's uncertainty ofsemiconductor industry. However, recognizing the
importance ofsemiconductor industry, big companies began investing enormous
amount of funds on production and research facilities for the self-development
of semiconductor and computer related products ince 1981. Subsequently, the
Ministry of Science and Technology establish a national research system in order
to stimulate product oriented research and developaent in the joint efforts of
government-supported institutes and the industry since 1982. Thereafter, ETRI
began catering its research activities to the national program and the RD$E
program became difficult to be carried out.
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Procurement
3.87 Procurement of equipment was executed byETRI in accordance with
the procedures established by the World Bank Loans. The majority ofequipment
was originally planned to be installed inthe early quarters of 1988. However,
in actuality most of the equipment was contracted inthe 3rd quarter of 1988
and installed inSeptember 1981, one and half years behind the original sche-
dule. The poor progress ofprocurement was mainly caused by (i) the delay in
construction of semiconductor building, and (ii) the adjustment ofsome items of
equipment due to some changes in research programs.
3.88 Sone of additional equipment was procured for the development of
32K / 64K ROM technology in1982, and for the conversion f3" bipolar line to 4"
line in 1984. In 1986, seven items of additional equipment were procured inorder
to improve such services as mask making and testing to the industry.
Project Cost
3.09 iA comparison f the original ppraisal with actual project cost is
given below
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Table 2: PROJECI COST
Units $000 (Local - Won million)
Appraisal Estimate I/ Actual Cost 2/
Description
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
(1) Construction & Equipment
.Constructiun 4,200 1,788 10,448 6,885 - 8,860
.Supporting equipment .808 5,368 7,-80l - 5,841 5,841
.R&D equipment 11,690 11,698 - 13,766 13,76G
.Installation, etc. 570 - 1,190 733 - 984
.Sub-total 5,570 18,830 30,338 6,738 19,687 28,651
(2) Technology Program
.Training 58 2,078 2,178 - 2,393 2,393
.Expert Invitation l80 770 980 - 940 948
.Tech. Acquisition - 1,660 1,660 - 1,008 1,008
Sub-total 150 4,500 4,810 - 4,333 4,333
(3) Contingencies 850 4,890 5,848 - - -
Total 6,570 27,428 40,980 6,738 23,940 32,984
I/ The exchange rate used at appraisal was $1 - 485 Won.
2/ The exchange rate for actual cost is at Annex 2.
3.1o The RD&E program is excluded in the above table due to non-execution
thereof. The local costs are the investment on the Cumi facilities for 1978-84,
and the foreign costs are the investments on equipment and technology programs
financed from the Bank loan for 1979-86.
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3.11 The Iccal costs oa completion jf construction is6,805 million won
v.s. 4,280 million #on at appraisal. The major reason for overruns is caused by
the increase of construction costs due to-the delay in construction fseriicon-
ductor building.
Disbursement
3.1. The estimated and actual annual cumulative disbursement of the loan is
as follows
Table 3: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT
($ Million)
Aippraisal Actuals I/ Actuals as Percent of
Bank Fiscal Year Estimate Appraisal Estimate
1979 13.3 0.047
1980 21.9 7.949 36
1981 27.6 14.718 54
1982 29.0 17.115 59
1983 20.397 70
1984 20.585 71
1985 26.681 71
1986 22.638 78
1987 23.941 21 83
1 The slow disbursement was caused by delays in procurement ofequipment and
by non-execution of RD&E program.
2, Final disbursement effected on January 38, 1987
- 19 -
Loan Allocation
3.'3 Original, revised and final all-cation of the loan are
Table 4: LOAN ALLOCATION
($ million)
Loan Revised Cancellation Final
Category Allocation Allocation 8/30/85 Allocation
Original 8/2 W/82
1) Equipment 17.7 19.6 - 19.6
2) Expert's Services 0.25 0.25 0.036 0.214
for Semiconductor
Facilities
3) Training, Experts' 4.15 4.15 - 4.15
Service and Technology
procurement
4) RD&E program 5.0 5.0 5.6
5) Unallocated 1.9
Total 29.0 29.0 5.036 23.964
3.14 In August 1982, the Bank agreed to use the unallocated funds for
procurement of equipment, taking in account the increased cost of contracted
amounts ofequipment. In accordance with discussions between the represent-
atives from the Bank and ETRI in Washington in July 1985, the Bank agreed to
cancel the use of the 85.0 million u der category 4 and the $36 thousand of
the remaining fund under category 2 in August 1985.
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Operation
3.15 Semiconductor processing facility urider tha project was brought into
operation i September 1981. Henceforth, ETRI was placed on a position toprovide
the industry with such services a wafer fabrication (bipolar nd MOS), mask
fabrication, IC testing, reliability test, etc. With the completion of computer
building in May 1982, system-related researchl activities began to be carried out
actively. However, computer p oduction project including printed circuit board
was given up and accordingly some items of PCB equipment procured were sold to
the industry.
3.16 With the enforcement of a national research system by MOST since 1982,
ETRI placed more emphasis onthe conduct of national research programs than on
providing the industrial services. Major projects like development of VTR IC's
and 8 bit microprocessor/microcomputer, development and ditribution of personal
computer, development of 8/16 bit CPAM machine and 16/32 bit UNIX computer, etc.
were carried out by the joint efforts of ETRI and the industry.
3.111 Since 1981, big electronic companies like Samsung, ColdStar nd Hyun-
dai began to invest in the semiconductor echnology inorder to take some port-
ion of the newly growing semiconductor ma ket, and the Korean government also
supported them for a breakthrough of electronic technology development in Korea.
In this regard, at the end of 1983, it was reviewed that ETRI should lead the
industry through development of more advanced tezhnologyies with up-grading the
semiconductor facility and transfer its semiconductor facility atCumi to the
private sector for more economic utilization of the facility. Accordingly the
transfer ofthe Cumi facility was proceeded with for bidding, and a transfer
contract was awarded with Daewoo Telecommunications in 1984. However, due to
Daewoo's waving of the transfer agreement inAugust 1984, the transfer p oblem
was held back. In January 1986, the transfer ofthe facilities was rebidded, and
coapletly transfered toColdStar Semiconductor in April 1986.
3.18 In the end of 1984, to meet the information society in the 2008's,
the Korean government decided to establish a new institution with the merter of
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the two institutes ; KIET at Cumi estate and KETRI at Daedog Science Park. In
March 1985, Electrornics andTeleconL'iunications Research Institute was establish-
ed with a future-oriented r search system-to undertake national research and
development onadvanced information technology integrating the areas of telecom-
munications, computers, automations and semiconductors. Thereafter, ETRI began
to carry out the custom semiconductor IC design activities including telecom-
munication IC's.
Performance ofConsultants, Contractors, Suppliers and Borrower
3.19 In accordance with the provision of Article 2.82 to the Project Agree-
ment, a technical advisor was empolyed in order to assist ETRI in carrying out
of technology programs and RD&E programs. The contract was entered into in October
1979 for two years and three times extended to June 1986 upon the extension of
the loan project. The technical advisor had worked at ETRI U. S. Office as a
part-time job, and visited ETRI when necessary. The performance of the technical
advisor overall was adequate. He effectively assisted ETRI in preparing bid
documents, pecifications, evaluation f bids for procurement of equipment, and
gave suitable recommendation on training and expert invitation programs.
3.24 As agreed under the provision of Article 2.83 to the Project Agreement,
a semiconductor facility expert was empolyed for two years starting in Septerber
1979 in order to give day-to-day supervision construction fsemiconductor
building. The performance of the expert was generally adequate, and ha also
assisted ETRI in procurement and installation fsemiconductor equipment, and
start-up operation of the semiconductor facility.
3.21 The performance of local civil engineering contractors for building
and supporting facilities was generally adequate, though the delay in construc-
tion of semiconductor building. The research and supporting facility equipment
contractors delivered and installed their equipment without any critical problem
on execution of the contracts.
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IV. OPERATING PERFORMN4ANCE
4.81 The actual services to industry such as wafer fabrication, nask making,
IC testing, liydrogen gas, tlaining for engineers from industry are given below
Table 5: SERVICES TO INDUSTRY
(Unit : Won millions)
Service Revenues 1979 1988 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Wafers - 9 5 99 56 - -
Masks 51 35 42 78 134 435 631
Testing 31 43 8 14 16 884 1,777
H2 Cas - - 34 82 212 - -
Training - 26 - 44 78 - -
Total 82 113 89 317 488 1,319 2,408
At appraisal of the project, the goal of ETRI was to become self-supporting with
the service incomes plus RD&E revenues ince 1984. However, the actual services
to the industry were carryed out so poorly that the comparision with that at the
appraisal was not made. The reasons on poor performance ofthe industrial se-
rvices were caused by (i) la.w start-up operation of semiconductor facility due
to the delay in construction a d equipping of the semiconductor facilities, tii)
demand reduction of wafers from the industry due to big companies' participation
in the semiconductor industry since 1981, and (iii) concentrating ETR's efforts
on national research programs instead of the industrial services ince 1982.
However, the supply of mask-sets and testing to the industry has been adequately
carried out to meet the demand thereon from the industry. In the training of
industry personnel, the number of technical manpower equired for the industry had
been trained through establishment of courses at ETRI such as design and process
technology ofsemiconductor, micro processor applications, UNIX, etc.
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4.02 The performance ofresearch and development inthe areas of semicon-
ductor and computer systems was adequately-carried out, though the RD0E prograis
with the assistance of the Bank loan was not proceeded with. The research acti-
vities may be described in the following three plhases
(a) First Plhase (1978 - 1981)
During this phase, ETRI developed the technological base through recruitmemt
of superior staff and foreign training of its engineers, while it was busy
with building construction a d equipment procurement. Development ofbasic
technologies inthe areas of semiconductor design and process, and partial
development ofcomputer hardware and software were carried out. Especially,
a traffic ontrol system for Seoul City was successfully developed and instal-
led in 1981, and its technology was transfered toOriental Pricision Co.
(b) Second Phase (1982 - 1984)
With the start of a national research program since 1982, in the semiconductor
area, ETRI acquired its development capabilities of advanced semiconductor
technology through development ofbasic CAD technology, fine line mask tech-
nology, epitaxial layer growing technology, quality assurance and control
technology, etc. In the joint efforts with the industry, ETRI developed bipolar
12L process technology and 5 items of VTR IC's using its process, and silicon
gate NMOS-CMOS process technology and 8 bit uPFuC IC using its process.
Especially the development ofYTR IC's was worthwhile because Japanese chip
suppliers had been hesitant o supply those IC's to Korean set makers. And as
in-house projects, pilot production of 32K/64K RON wafers was successfully
carryed out in 1982 - 83, first in Korea, with the technical assistance from
VTI in the USA, and semiconductor sustaining technology was started to be
devloped in 1982, which resulteA in acquiring semiconductor p oduction tech-
nology.
-- 24 -
In computer area. by virtue of computer standardization in microsystems,
system development with standard components was performed by using systen
integration a d software porting technology. For the purpose of development
of Korean-type micro computer systems, development of 8/16 bit u-processor
based CP/4 machines, personal computers for education and 16/32 bit UNIX
systems were carried out in the joint efforts with the industry, Especially
16132 bit UNIX system technology was transfered tothe participant companies.
(c) Third Phase (1985 - 86)
With the establishment of ETRI, in order to meet the information society in
the 2980's, the areas of electronics and telecommunications, which will play
the key role as the infrastructure in the society, are required for the
systematic technology development integrating computers, telecommunications,
automation control, semiconductor, software, etc. For this purpose, ET:I
started the technology develpment ofcomputers, automations, custom VLSI's
and next generation semiconductors.
In computer area, in order to develop computer systems for the national
administration nformation services, the required technologies are under
development, and research and development projects for obtaining the abili-
ties to develop knowledge processing computer systems using the artificial
intelligence t chnology have been proceeded. In 1986 development ofmulti-
processor computer system started for developing supermini computer system.
In automation area, for the purposes of development of the technologies of
standardized distributed control systems and provision of technological
background with the industry to have the advanced structures of industrial
manufacturino systems, ETRI started evelopment ofa manufacturing inform-
ation processing system, graphic workstation, and instrumernt a dcontrol
technologies.
In semiconductor area, with the creative conception and technology based on
the technology development capabilities accumulated by the second phase,
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ETRI started the carrying out of development ofcustom VLSI techlnologies for
telecommunication IC's, computer systems, etc., development ofmenmfry devices
including 4M DRRM, development ofdesign automation system, development of
next generation semiconductor (GaAs, etc.), development of process equipment
and materials, and surface analysis technology.
V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
5.91 At the appraisal of the project, ETRI was to become self-surporting
with the service incomes and royalty revenues within five years. However, as
seen in section of Operating Performance, the industrial services were poorly
carried out and the RD&E program with the Bank loan was not executed completely.
Accordingly, the comparison of the actual financial performance with that at the
appraisal was not made, and the actual financial statements are attached hereto
as Annexes 3, 4 and 5.
5.82 The numbers in the financial statements in 1985-86 showed much inc-
reases due to the merger of two Institutes. The research costs had been mostly
supported by the MOST by 1984, but since 1985 the research costs are being in
great portion by the Korea Teleconuunication Authority (KTA) besides the MOST.
A new semiconductor research facility is under construction with the finanicial
support of KTA aiming at the completion f its construction i september 1987.
5.03 The transfer of the Guni facility to the private sector was, as seen
in section of Operation, completely ended In April 1986. The transfer price was
16,865 million won in total : 15,365 million won for assets and 1,566 million won
for bid premium. Of the transfer price, the IBRD loan liability equivalent to
USD14,211 thousand was assumed by Cold Star Semiconductor Co., the Assignee, and
the balance of 4,217 million won was paid in cash.
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VI. INtSTITUTIONAL PERPFORMANCE
OrKanization a d Manarement
6.91 The former KIET was established inDecember 1976 as an outgrowth of
the semiconductor development and systems units in Korea Institute of Science aild
Technology. A suitably qualified president was designated in November 1977, and
ETRI was expected to be run as the service-cum-RD & E organization since 1984.
A seperate IBRD project management unit was not created, but the management of
the IBRD project was carried out by the project development group.
2.92 While building construction a d equipment procurement were still on
progress, a new president was designated in February 1981, and ETRI was reorgan-
ized for more effective management towards the RD & E-oriented operation of the
semiconductor facility instead of the production services for industry, and
accordingly ETRI's efforts has been emphasized oncarrying out the national
research programs to meet the government's goals for science and technology
development since 1982.
6.93 ETRI's performance has been, in general, adequate ven though the
self-supporting goal was not attained. However, many difficulties inmanagement
of the project have been encountered due to the number of changes of managers,
the transfer of the Cumi facility to the private sector, and the merger of two
institutes (KIET and KETRI). Effectively coping with these diffilculties, ETRI
had contributed, toa great measure, to promoting and stimulating the technology
development ofKorea industry in the areas of semiconductor and computer systems.
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Staffing, Recruitment and Training
6.84 In order to lead Korean industry with advanced technology capabil-
ities in the related areas, ETRI was required to recruit a superior staff and
train them. During the period of the project, recruiting the superior staff was
not easy because Cuni estates had not been developed as a Silicon Valley in Korea
as planned ue to the industry's negative response on the move to the Electronics
Industrial Complex at Cumi, and superior manpower preferred to enter research
institutions and/or pay-well companies in Seoul or its vicinity. Besides, some of
the superior staff were lost to academic institutions and/or the industry due to
the 1uug period of proceedings with the transfer of the Cumi facility to the
private sector since the end of 1983.
6.85 The training program for ETRI engineers was originally tobe carried
out in the three major phases : (i) basic training at KAIST, other Korean
universities, and courses at ETRI itself ; (ii) overseas group and fellowship
training under formal training schemes in academic and industrial settings ; and
(iii) on-the-job experience in overseas companies in selected technologies.
Overseas training programs in the above (ii) and (iii) have been adequately
carried out, as stated in the section of the Implementation Schedule. Courses at
ETRI such courses as u-processor applications, computer languages, micro computer
software, semiconductor design / process, etc., had been adequately carried out
for ETRI staff as well as engineers from the industry. Basic training at KAIST
has been carried out since 1981 with the operation of part-time courses for the
engineers from research institutions.
Accountinr SYstem
6.06 At the appraisal of the project, ETRI was to establish a separate
financial department for developing an appropriate cost accounting system in
view of the complex financial accounting requirements related to ETRI operations
and RD & E. However, though a financial department was established inthe end
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of 1986, a cost accounting system was not made because ETRI gave its major efforts
OG national research pro-ra2s if.sead of the industrial services. Accordingly,
the government's budgetinZ and acaounting-systae has been continuously appliedc.
Audit
6.67 In accordance with the provision of Article 4.82 of the Project
Agreement, the local accounting firms have audited ETRI's accounts since 1988
and the audited accounts have consistantly 'been submitted to the Bank within
the covenanted time of four months after the end of each fiscal year.
6.68 ETRI established an internal audit system, and a fully qualified
internal auditor was appointed in 1978. His replacements were generally qual-
ified, and the system has worked well to meet efficency and improvement of
lintitutional operation and management, especially seeking prior prevention
of the expected problems.
VII. PRC)JECT JUSTIFICATION
ProJect Achievement
7.61 The project in general achieved the objectives set out at appraisal
through the provision of the industrial services and carrying out the national
research program, though the RD & E program with the Bank loan was not carried
out. The supply of mask-sets and testing service has contributed toimport sub-
stitution, reduction of turnaround times, cost-saving, and improvement ofproduct
quality and reliability for Korean semiconductor industry. Through the success-
ful conduct of the national research program since 1982, especilly in the joint
efforts of ETRI and the industry, the project has greatly contributed topromot-
ing the development ofa technological base in the Korea electronics industry.
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.onsequently, Korea is now enjoying import substitution a d export increase of
electronic products 3atd evices through the localization f then. Besides, the
trainIng Jf industry personnel at ETRI facility has greatlj- contributed tothe
development of the technological base of Korean electronics industry, and also
those who was trained at ETRI have also played the important roles for establish-
clent of the private training centers in the areas of semiconductor and systems.
7. 02 In the semiconductor a ea, design and process technologies ofVTR
IC's developed with the joint efforts with the industry was successfully trans-
fered to the two participating companies. Thereafter, VTR IC's are now under
commercial production for import substitution. ETRI has, through development of
silicon gate NMOS / CMOS technologies, effectively contributed tostimulating the
industry's vigorous investment onsemiconductor p oduction facilities and the
indusry's technological base. Consequently. the industry developed 64 K DRAM in
1984 and 256K DRAM in lY85, which are now under commercial production, and also
successfully developed the prototype of I F. DRAM in 1986. In addition, based on
the research and development experiences in the meantime, ETRI and three big
companies started the development ofsubmicro meter VLSI technology ona large-
scale national program in 1986, wiilich is expected to bring out a productive 4 M
DRAM within two years.
7.83 In the coaputer area, ETRI promoted a computer mind in Korea through
the successful development and distribution fpersonal computer for education
in joint efforts with five local firms. 16 bit UNIX system technology was
successfully put into commercial production at the participating companies in
1984, and also 32 bit UNIX systems technology developed in 1986 will be trans-
fered to the participating companies in 1987. Subsequently, the industry is now
accelerating local production fsmall & medium size computers. Furthermore, with
the use of the accumaulated technologies in the past years, in 1986 ETRI started
the development ofsuper-mini computer system technology, knowledge processing
computer systems, FA network systems technology, instrument and control tech-
nology, etc., effectively toassist he realization f ISDN by the year 2960.
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Project Spin-offs
7.04 As spin offs from the project, ETRI obtained such research results
as design drawings, masks, design tools, etc. of semiconductor devices, and
prototypes, development documents, etc. of PCM, P/C and 16/32 bit computer
systems.
Least Cost Solution
7.05 ETRI has overalI adopted the least cost policy in every step of
planning, review and execution of research programs, not to mention building
construction a d equipment procurement a the early stage of the project.
However, the delay in construction f the semiconductor building r-sulted in
cost increase.
Rate of Return
7.06 Since ETRI has been continuously involved in the research and devel-
opment programs with the assistance of the government, he rate of return could
not be applied. However, the small amouznt ofroyalty from technology transfers
to the industry was used for payment of staff incentive and the cost of basic
in-house research programs. Besides, the project attained indirect investment
effects like import substitution a d foreign export through localization fthe
semiconductor and computer products with the help of the services and joint
development programs provided by ETRI during the period of the project.
VIII. BANK PERFORMANCE
Overall and Specific Performance
8.01 The performance of the Bank in respect of the project was adequate
in general. The Bank's contribution at the stage of preparation was a positive,
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and had a naterial impact on the decision of the Korean governaent toestablish
the former KIET as a government-supported. institution which would stimulate and
support he electronics iadustry's drive into the new areas of seziconductor
and system technology.
Supervision
8.02 Bank supervision ver the period 1977 - 86 averages more than one
mission per year. The Bank's mission closely reviewed several problems occurred
during the implementation of the project, and their comments overall helped
ETRI's proper solution thereon. In addition, during the period of proceeding
with the transfer of the Cumi facility to the private sector, and merger of two
institutes (KIET and KETRI), the Bank assisted ETRI in leaping up the step of
advanced research and development with a new semiconductor research facilities.
Working RelationshiP
8.83 The relationships between ETRI, the government of ROK and the Bank
were overall reasonable. ETRI has always kept the Bank fully informed, as in
the cases of proceeding with training and expert invitation programs as well as
in the steps of the invitation tobid, bidding, the award of contracts for
equipment procurement. Quarterly progress reports, yearly financial reports etc.
have been also submitted to the Bank in accordance with the relavant provisions
of the Project Agreement.
IX. CONCLUI ION
9.61 The project has made valuable contribution towards the technological
development of the Korean electronics industry, especially with the emphasis on
semiconductor and system areas, in order to achieve a high growth level. By virtue
of developaent ofETRI's technological base, and the joint research program with
and the services to the industry, ETRI has promoted and stimulated the industry's
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technological dievelopnent i  he areas of the semiconductor and systems.
Consequently, in1986 ETRI and the industry began to carry out the higher level of
research and development prograts such as high density submicron VLSI technology,
custom VLSI technology for telecommunication IC's, and super minicomputer tech-
nology with the creative conception a d technology in 1986. Korea also began to
enjoy import substitution a d foreign export in the areas of semiconductor and com-
puter related products and devices ince 1985.
9.82 The institutional impact of the project has been significant. Based
onthe former KIET's achievements ofthe technological development inthe areas
of semiconductor and systems, a future-oriented institution (ETRI) was established
in 1985 in order to build the solid infrastructure for the information society
in the 2800's. ETRI aims at carrying out the systematic research and development
activities in the information e gineering technology areas integrating telecom-
munications, computers, and sophisticated semiconductors. In this regard, the
Cumi facility established under this project was transfered to the private sector
in 1986, for the more economical utilization f the facility, and a new semi-
conductor research facility is under construction with the target of completion f
its construction i September 1987.
9.63 The project seems unattractive ineconomic terms, due to the poor
performance of the industrial services. This was caused by the late start-up
operation of the semiconductor facility, and the industry's self-equipping of
their semiconductor production facilities, which reduced the need for ETRI's
provision of wafers. However, the supply of mask-sets ans testing to the industry
were , in general, adequately performed to meet the demand for the industry.
The RD&E program was not executed at all. This was caused by the industry's
negative responses thereon at the early stage of the project, and by giving
ETRI's major efforts to the national research program.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ROREA
ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
(Loan 1676-0O)
COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANTS
Section Covenant Status
Loan AKreenent
3.82 Covernaent to provide ETRI with a US $300,080 Yes.
advance to pay for Bank financed it6ns in
1979 - 88.
4..2 (a) rovernnent to provide ETRI with such funds as Yes.
operating costs, working capital requirements
and capital expenditures ineach year.
4.03 (a) Periodical reviews by the Government of ETIR Yes. The Covernient
staff conpensation structure. has reviewed thestaff
compensation structure
at the annual Board
l.eeting,
Project Agreement
2.02 ETRI to enpoly experts to assist in carrying Yes.
out the technology program.
2.03 ETRI to eaploy a semiconductor facility Yes.
expert to assist in the supervision of cons-
truction of the semiconductor building.
2.06 (c) ETRI to furnish the Bank with quarterly Yes.
progress reports on the project implement-
ation, procurement s atus of goods, techno-
logy and services.
2..8 (a) ETRI to submit annually to the Bank a four-year Partial. Though poor
RO&E pro-ran and an annual technology acquisi- progressed the RD&E
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Lion praorabl. proZ-rani, the submis-
sion of these progracns
to the Banik had been
made urntil 1984.
".09 (a) ETRI to furnislh the Bank with annual pro- Yes.
grams for training and experts invitation.
3.04 (b) Except as the Bank agrees, ETRI shall not Yes.
sell, lease, tranfer or dispose of its pro-
perties or assets.
3.05 ETRI to establish and maintain.a separate Partial. A financial
financial and accounting department to be and accounting depart-
headed by a qualified financial director. ment was established in
1980 and abolished at
the end of 1981.
3.06 ETRI to employ a technical advisor to Yes.
assist in the discharge of its managerial
functions.
3.07 ETRI to adopt and implement a cost account- No. Due to the poor pro-
ing system in consultation with the Bank. gress of the services,
the government's budget
and accounting system
has been continuously
applied.
3.08 ETRI to adopt and implement a staff incen- Partial. fAn incentive pay-
tive system. ment rule was adopted and
implemented only in 1983.
4.02 ETRI to furnish the Bank the auditors with Yes.
reports of acceptable scope and details
within four months of the close of the
fiscal year.
4.04 Except as otherwise agreed with the Bank Yes.
and until Decesber 31, 1983, ETRI to make
no capital expenditures xceeding
$2,880,088 equivalent in any one year.
2ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
(Loan 1676-KO)
BALANCE SHEETS
1 1979 1986 1981 1 1982 1 1983 I 1984 I 1985 1 1986 I
F~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ I_ I + I * I I I
i! - I i I I I I I I ICurrent AJsets I I I I I I I
1. ash I 38 1 164 1 3.505 2.16 1 6.356 1 19.002 1 33.uI I
1. Accounits Recelvable I 744 I 286 1 233 1 167 1 445 1 255 1 3.134 1 2.719 1
1. Inventories I 66 1 38 I 144 1 98 1 641 I 488 1 1.438 I 1.012 I
O. ther Current Assets | 333 1 264 1 17l I 542 I 1. IO | 622 1 1.075 1 337 1| Total Current Assets |I t1176 I 6 1 29 I 4. 31 4 1i,3-2T 7.721 1 24, 649 1 37.371 1
I Fixed Assets
I. Gross Plixed Assets | 3.679 | 10.782 1 16.439 I 18.83 I 21,236 I 21.752 1 34.268 1 32,781 I|. Less Depreciation I 36 1 136 1 736 1 2,179 1 3.911 5.803 1 1.922 I 4.569 1
IHet Fixed Assets | 3.043 1 16,646 1 15.709 1 15.904 1 17.326 1 15.949 I 32.346 1 28.212 I
I I I I I I 'I I ~ ~ ~~~~~I I
Iether Assets | 414 I 325 1 ill 125 I 106' I 190 I 6.056 I 21,248 1
I~ ~ ~ I - I _ I*- _I-I_ I .IITotatl Assets 1 4.633 1 11.663 1 16,649 1 20.341 1 21.753 I 23.866 I 63.045 I '86,831 I
ILIABILITIES & CAPITAL I I I I I I I I I
ICurreit LiabilIties I I 741 1 664 I 3.694 I 1.962 I 8.344 I 18.659 I 25.750 1
ILong-term Liabilities I 1.053 I 6.534 1 10.834 1 12.928 1 13.836 I 8.828 I 11.871 1 15,224 1I (Including Bank l.oan) I (23) 1 (6.464) 1 (16.250) 1 (12,321) 1 (13. 193) I (8.648) 1 (11.871) I (15.224) 1IOther Liabilities I . _ I . I I .I 595 1 3.151 I -112L I
l,otal Liabilities 1 1.053 | 7.275 I 11.498 1 16,622 1 15,792 I 17.767 1 33.688 4S,295 !
I Equlty Punil
I. Goveinment Conitribution I 3.621 I 4.452 1 5.6s2 1 6,380 1 6.737 1 7.819 1 7.964 1 24.041|. Industry Contribution, etc. | 471 I 487 I 564 I 586 1 2.883 I 2.946 1 23,365 1 19.585 I|. Earned Suplus/Deficit I 89 1 ffL I -1,0665 1 -2.67 I -3.659 1 -4.672 1 -1.904 1 -2. 09 I
ITotal fquity 1 3,582 1 4,388 1 5,151 1 4.319 1 53. 966T i i -2 973&S I -i;5-3 1
ITotal L.iabilitics & Capital I 4.633 1 11.663 1 16.649 1 20.341 1 21.753 1 23.860 1 63.045 1 86.831 I I I I I I I I I Il I ...-.-.. ....~ . .______ 4 I . . ._____ ___
ANNEX 3
ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
(Loan 1676-KO)
INCOME STATEMENTS
I | 1979 1 1980 1 1981 1 1982 1 1983 1 1984 1 1985 1 1986 1
EVFl I I I i I I I I II -IEPNE I I I I I I I II
Project Revenues I 420 I 607 1 645 I 4.236 1 9.199 1 4.842 I 14.981 I 21.182 1
iRoyalty Incone I - I - I 1 19 1 5 1 14 1 - I 48 IIGovernment Contrivution 1 678 I 948 3. 172 i 3.012 1 2.329 1 2.809 1 - I 4.019 1lOther Income I 185 1 469 1 293 1 142 1 1,215 I 669 1 1.568 1 .93 II I 1,27 I 1.964 I 4.110 I 7.4600 12.748 I 8.334 1 16.549 1 15.301 IIOPERATING EXPENSS I I I I I I I I I
Iflrect(ost I I I I I I I I I
I .Labor I 106 1 221 128 I 669 1 1.282 1 533 1 3.130 I 5.499 1
I laterials I 229 1 26 I 222 I 759 1 723 1 558 1 2.425 4.625 II . Overheads I 3 I 157 1 268 8 2.127 1 6.026 1 2.796 1 4.829 1 11.300 1|General and Administrative I 851 I 1,576 1 2.961 1 2,838 1 2.869 : 2.665 I 5.586 I 9.167Depreciatlon I 21 I 94 1 $95 I IL472 1. 7qS 1.983 1 91S _ 32.6 I
I 1,216 I 2.248 | 4.654 I 7.865 | 12.691 | 8.475 | 16.88 I 13.6hSI II~~~ I I . I I *I I I I |OPrRlATI NG INI MM/OSS 65 I -284 I 56 4 65 | 57.. I -141 1 -336 | 1. 600 1
I I I i I I ' 1 1I ILES' . Interest 3 - I 07 I 568 I 791 1 996 893 1 949 I 1.682 1| . Other 1 21 49 1 61 280 1 731 471 663 S84I
I . Income Tax I - I _ I _ I I I _ ; 161 1261
NUFF I NfVE / f IDSS | 63 1 -640 1 -518 1 -1,476 1.012 -1.081 I -1.964 1 -142 1I ~ ~ ~ ~~I I I I I I I I I
I ._ I . I 
4ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
(Loan 1676-KO)
EMS FLOW STATENTS
f~~~~~~~~~~~ _ 
I I 1979 I 1986 -1981 I 1982 I 1983  194 1985 I 1986
I I ----- 
ISOURL9SS I I I I I I I
I Internal cash Gleneratlo. I I I I I I 1 I II Net Inooe 1 63 1 -649 I -518 1 -1.476 1 -1.812 1 -1.Q81 I -1.904 1 -142
Depreciationi, etc. 1 76 I 387 1 871 2.761 I 4.490 l 2.32 1 7.131 26.898 
133 I -253 I 30 1.285 I 3.478 I 1.451 I 5.227 I 26.666 I
|Conteributlous | 1.376 ; 1.449 I 1.277 I 759 8 2.654 | 1.146 I 13.238 | 12.248 |
ILong-term Borrowings 1 22 1 6.381 | 4.743 1 1.475 1 1.80 1 89 1 199 I 2.645 i
I (luclodding Bank Loam) I I (4.423) 1 (1.475) I (1.808) 1 (89) i 1 (2.645) I t
IPrior Year AdJusteent | - I - |4 I _. 1 2 1 68- 1 _I * I
i 1.531 I 7.577 1 6,333 1 3.453 1 7.942 1 2.754 I 18.664 I 41.559 m _6
_ _ _ II 'I11 IAPPLICATIONS I I I I I I I
I I I I 1 1 1 1 I
Aldditlons to Fixed Assets 1 2.552 I 7.825 1 6.23 I 2.099 9 5.528 | 1.277 8 .831 I 33.393 1
IDecrease In Long-term Debt I - I - I - I 126 1 1.193' 1 4.319 1 3.787 1 .027 I| (Includins Payment of 1IMD Loan) I I I I - I (99:.) 1 (4.319) 1 (3.787) 1 (2.827) 1
ISeverance Payments to Employees 1 19 I 12 68 1 72 79 1 149 1 57 159 I
IPrior Year Adlustent I - I - I __ 1 109 I _ L I - I _ I _ 2! I
2562 I 7.837 I 6.091 1 2.466 1 6.891 1 5.736 1 12.674 1 35.S18 I
I Caiange bWorking Capital I -1.931 1 -261 1 242 1 1.053 I 1.141 ; -2,981 1 5.998 1 6,941 1
II _ I .
-
ITotal Applicatiotis I 1.531 I 7.577 1 6. I 1453 1 7.942 I 2.754 1 18.664 1 41.5~9 I
I- I I I I i I I , II I _ t I I * I * _ I 
